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This study aims to investigate whether experimentally induced prior beliefs affect process-
ing of evidence including the updating of beliefs under uncertainty about the unknown
probabilities of outcomes and the structural, outcome-generating nature of the environ-
ment. Participants played a gambling task in the form of computer-simulated slot machines
and were given information about the slot machines’ possible outcomes without their asso-
ciated probabilities. One group was induced with a prior belief about the outcome space
that matched the space of actual outcomes to be sampled; the other group was induced
with a skewed prior belief that included the actual outcomes and also fictional higher out-
comes. In reality, however, all participants sampled evidence from the same underlying
outcome distribution, regardless of priors given. Before and during sampling, participants
expressed their beliefs about the outcome distribution (values and probabilities). Evaluation
of those subjective probability distributions suggests that all participants’ judgments con-
verged toward the observed outcome distribution. However, despite observing no support-
ing evidence for fictional outcomes, a significant proportion of participants in the skewed
priors condition expected them in the future. A probe of the participants’ understanding of
the underlying outcome-generating processes indicated that participants’ judgments were
based on the information given in the induced priors and consequently, a significant pro-
portion of participants in the skewed condition believed the slot machines were not games
of chance while participants in the control condition believed the machines generated out-
comes at random. Beyond Bayesian or heuristic belief updating, priors not only contribute
to belief revision but also affect one’s deeper understanding of the environment.
Keywords: model-based learning, belief revision, priors, gambling, probability judgment
INTRODUCTION
When a decision making process occurs over a temporally
extended interval, new evidence may accumulate over time that
warrants the updating of initial beliefs. Particularly in novel envi-
ronments where initial beliefs may be based on only scant infor-
mation, how should we integrate our initial beliefs about the
environment with subsequent observations?
Combining a prior description with experience is an everyday
activity, as mundane as judging the likelihood that it will rain
later in the afternoon, given a weather forecast and one’s own
observations from looking out the window. Consider, for example,
slot machines. At most slot machines today, the only information
known to players before the start of a game is a long-run payout
percentage and a succinct payout table that lists which outcomes
are associated with which combinations of symbols (or, as some
might have you believe: which combinations of symbols cause
which outcomes). This incomplete description of the environment
lacks probability information for the listed outcomes. Players must
repeatedly play the machines to learn about the missing probability
distributions and learn which machines may be most valuable to
play at. In other words, the slot machine is an inductive inference
problem. Gambles are of particular interest to the study of induc-
tive inference because they are so similar to everyday reasoning and
yet very dissimilar at the same time. Due to the underlying ran-
domness in many gambles (such as slot machines), people who
fare well in everyday reasoning can fail in the face of gambles.
Indeed, it is still a mystery why people can be so good at some
gambles (such as poker) and yet so bad at others (roulette). How
can we account for this?
In this paper, we investigate the impact of initial descriptive
information about an environment of uncertainty on judgments
about the environment’s structure. Our study extends previous
work on the topic by investigating the impact of induced pri-
ors as well as evidence on judgments and beliefs about structure.
To accompany the slot machines in our full-feedback paradigm,
we provide payout tables, thereby controlling the initial beliefs
of which outcomes are possible. However, we do not provide the
probability distribution nor set one machine to be more profitable.
Instead, we manipulate whether the evidence is congruent or
incongruent with prior beliefs. How will participants update their
prior beliefs given this evidence? To anticipate our results, we find
that neither simple Bayesian nor heuristic-based accounts of belief
revision can explain our findings; instead, a model-based frame-
work is proposed for a descriptive account of decision making over
time.
Prior knowledge is a central factor of decision making theo-
ries, across the spectrum from heuristic (gambler’s fallacy: a prior
regarding representativeness of outcomes; Tversky and Kahne-
man, 1971; Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; anchoring and adjust-
ment: insufficiently adjusting estimates from a reference point;
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Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) to rational (game theory: consis-
tency of prior beliefs between players in a game; Harsanyi, 1967).
Likewise, research has demonstrated that different assumptions
for priors can lead to different posterior beliefs (Troutman and
Shanteau, 1977; Koehler, 1993) as can prior outcomes affect sub-
sequent judgments and decisions (Thaler and Johnson, 1990).
Decision makers may maintain their initial hypotheses by dis-
missing disconfirming evidence (Klayman and Ha, 1987) or even
inappropriately using disconfirming evidence to support initial
hypotheses (Snyder and Swann, 1978; Doherty et al., 1979; Fis-
chhoff and Beyth-Marom, 1983). Under uncertainty, prior beliefs
can have a cascading effect on subsequent judgment and decision
making that is deeper than mere belief-adjustment.
The model-based approach to understanding learning uniquely
captures this relationship between prior and posterior beliefs. It
derives psychological validity from theories of internal representa-
tions of external events or ideas. Well-known examples of internal
representations in the literature include schemas, structures of
knowledge that include concepts of components, attributes, and
relationships between specific instances (Simon, 1957; Schank and
Abelson, 1977; Bower, 1981; Pearson et al., 1984), and mental
models, internal symbolic understanding of the external world
(Johnson-Laird, 1983). Models in this sense are small-scale rep-
resentations of reality, neglecting facts, and relationships that
are outside one’s scope of knowledge with cascading effects on
reasoning. As in previous theories of decision making that use
models, this approach includes representations of the states of
the environment, actions, and rewards (as opposed to model-free
learning, which assumes no representation of structure; Dayan and
Niv, 2008); however, the present model-based approach focuses
on inference in contrast to optimized decision making. A close
and very interesting example of model-based inference can be
found in Lopes (1976) though here, too, the emphasis is on how
to optimize betting rather than how models influence under-
standing of the structure of the game. Although computational
model-based learning considers the value of these representa-
tions in the construction of a model of the environment, the
present perspective emphasizes representations of explanatory,
causal, and goal-directed beliefs about the relationships between
these components.
The top-down structure enables the agent to reason broadly
and make inferences about classes and categories of events and
relationships using prior knowledge as well as in a more detailed
manner about the specifications of the current problem using data.
The revision process, in which models are updated as new evidence
is acquired, utilizes the structure of the models to exploit previ-
ous experience and knowledge, including information about the
relationship between events such as data-generating processes, not
just the events themselves (Sutton and Barto, 1998). The learner
evaluates new information against his or her prior beliefs, much
like Edwards (1968) and the belief-adjustment model of Hogarth
and Einhorn (1992) in which new evidence is added or averaged
with previous information using anchoring and adjustment. How-
ever, within the model-based framework, new evidence can be
observed without requiring adjustment to the model. The overall
process can be depicted as a feedback loop whereby the outcomes
of the learner’s actions are fed back into his or her beliefs about
the problem. Figure 1 illustrates this loop: the consequence of
an outcome after an agent’s action may be to update the policy
directly or to feed back to the agent’s model and be integrated
with prior beliefs. For example, fluctuations in outcome within a
range of expected possible outcomes, such as those in scenarios
with random processes, need not change the learner’s model of
the environment (Yu and Dayan, 2005). A player at a slot machine
may avoid a machine after experiencing losses or, depending on
his model of the outcome-generating process, stay at the machine
because a win is more likely to occur after a string of losses. A poker
player may fold after observing another player raise or, depending
on his model of the player, re-raise because he believes based on
previous games with that player the raise to be a bluff. Because
models of the environment are highly structured and include his-
tories of previously held beliefs, new information can go beyond
adjustments to cause qualitative and systemic changes in models.
Critically, as a consequence of these two dissociable compo-
nents of model and belief revision, an individual may appear to
behave irrationally while implementing rational inference. If the
player at the slot machine holds a model of the game whereby a
string of losses is certainly followed by a win, then he acts rationally
when he continues to play despite losing. If the model of the prob-
lem is inaccurate, it may be the case that new evidence does not
correct errors despite the correct implementation of the updat-
ing process. The individual may persist in believing inaccurate
information.
The model-based learning framework is not commonly cited
in psychological research on decision making. Researchers more
often appeal to rational Bayesian accounts (Edwards et al., 1963;
Steyvers et al., 2003; Tenenbaum et al., 2006). Bayes’ theorem,
a general mathematical rule commonly used for belief updating
using evidence, results in a posterior probability expressing the
degree of belief about the likelihood of a hypothesis being true
after observing data. However, while Bayesian inference itself may
be straightforward, the assumptions made about the hypothesis
sets and approximation algorithms are less clear, and sometimes
lacking in theoretical and empirical grounding (Jones and Love,
2011). The psychological implications as regards to the cognitive
capacity required to consider all evidence even-handedly, generate
exhaustive sets of hypotheses, and calculate likelihoods are out of
FIGURE 1 |The cycle of model revision over time (Sutton and Barto,
1998, p. 231).
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reach for most people, including experts (Meehl, 1954; Fischhoff
et al., 1978; Fischhoff and Beyth-Marom, 1983).
To study the integration of prior beliefs with evidence accu-
mulated over time, we use a slot machine modification of the
“computerized money machine” typically used in decision-from-
experience tasks (e.g., Barron and Erev, 2003). Two slot machines
each present a “button” to push that offer probabilistic payouts
based on distributions unknown to the participant at the start.
One difference to previous experiments is that, in the present task,
the machines are identical. As we are primarily interested in how
the descriptive information is combined with experience, we did
not complicate the task further. A second critical difference is that
the slot machine provides additional descriptive information to
the participant in the form of a payout table that lists the space of
potential outcomes. This will be discussed in greater detail below.
Previous work using this decision making over time paradigm
has focused on finding differences between problems based on
description and those based on experience (Barron and Erev, 2003;
Hertwig and Erev, 2009; Ungemach et al., 2009). This paper focuses
instead on an area slightly outside of that dialog: the combined
effect of description and experience. Newell and Rakow (2007)
discuss this research question with a binary prediction game using
dice for which participants are given outcome probabilities and the
opportunity to experience outcomes over time. When given only
abstract, descriptive information about the outcomes and prob-
abilities, participants were likely to choose the optimal strategy;
when given both abstract information and experience, participants
were more likely to sub-optimally probability match. Although
this finding reveals the combined effect of descriptive and expe-
riential information on risky choice, it does not provide a deeper
insight into the cognitive processes participants may be using in
such tasks. Strategy probes questioned participants only at the
end of games and did not capture the reasons behind response
choices. Critically, with dice stimuli that represent a definitively
random outcome-generating process with known probabilities,
questions of how participants learn about structure and probabil-
ity distributions under uncertainty are outside the scope of that
study.
To test the effects of prior knowledge on learning, we manip-
ulate the content of the prior. Some participants were induced
with the “control” condition prior, which accurately reflected the
abstract outcome information for the task to be played: the slot
machine payout table included all valid outcomes only. In con-
trast, other participants were induced with a skewed prior, which
reflected the same information as controls with the addition of fic-
tional higher outcomes. All participants played the same machines
and observed effectively the same evidence. What effect would the
different priors have on beliefs about structure and probability as
new evidence was attained?
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Fifty-three participants were recruited to participate in paid stud-
ies on gambling from the University College London Psychology
Department Subject Pool, a popular online UK notice board, and
local newspapers. All individuals gave their informed consent to
participate in the experiment, as approved by the Department of
Psychology at University College London.
DESIGN
The design comprised one within-subjects factor over time with
three levels (before the start of the game, after 30 trials, after 80 tri-
als) and one between-subjects factor with two levels (congruency
of payout table and outcomes, “skewed” in congruency). Partic-
ipants were randomly assigned to conditions, resulting in a final
sample of 27 participants in the congruent payout table group
and 26 participants in the skewed payout table group. Participants
played 80 mandatory pulls on the machines and answered ques-
tions before the start of play, after 30 arm pulls, and at the end after
80 arm pulls; machine choice and pace were up to participants but
the total number of pulls played was fixed.
All participants played the same task with equivalent slot
machines that sampled from the same underlying distribution of
outcomes: 0, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 10. Participants in the control condi-
tion were shown a payout table before the start of the game that
displayed the outcome values of the game and their associated reel
symbol combinations (i.e., congruent with the observed evidence:
0, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 10). The other group of participants was shown the
same payout table, but now with fictional higher-value outcomes
(i.e., incongruent with the observed evidence: 0, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 15,
20, 25, and 100). Despite the different payout tables, both groups
played the same task and observed random draws from the same
underlying distribution. No participants were shown the proba-
bilities associated with the outcomes. The skewed table suggested
an initial belief that overlapped with the control participants’ but
also included fictional higher-value outcomes that would not be
observed during the experiment1.
Participants were randomly assigned to either the experimen-
tal skewed or the control condition and remained unaware of any
alternative task specifications. In each condition, participants were
informed that their compensation would depend on the bank’s
value at the end of the task.
MATERIALS
The slot machines required a five pence stake for each play, which
was taken from the £3.00 bank endowed by the experimenter to the
participant at the start of the task. The machines used a random
process to select outcomes from a fixed distribution: an outcome
of 0, 2, 3, 4, or 5 pence with 17.4% probability each or 10 pence
with 13.0%. The expected value of a play at any machine was 3.9
pence, at a loss of 1.1 pence given the cost to play.
The experiment interface used fruit graphics, which are highly
associated with slot machines imagery, and animations such as
spinning reels and moving levers to simulate the appearance of
real-world slot machines. The size of the screen display allowed
the participant to see up to three symbols on each reel depend-
ing on the reel position. The machines had a single payout line
(combinations of symbols must fall on the payout line to qualify
for winnings) through the middle; symbols above and below (near
1Although the higher-value outcomes were fictional in this instance, the distribution
is not dissimilar from real-world slot machines for which the desirable high-value
outcomes are generated at infinitesimally low probabilities.
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misses) were also viewable but randomized. When a participant
clicked on a machine to play it, the reels appeared to spin, and then
slow to a rest after 3 s, displaying the final screen of fruit symbol
graphics that matched the outcome received on that trial. The final
screen and numerical outcome value (e.g., four pence) was shown
on the screen for 1.5 s. The screen then returned to the initial state
and participants could click on the machine they wished to play
next. No bank or cumulative total information was shown to the
participant at any time during the task except after completion.
When asked to illustrate their beliefs about what outcomes the
machines paid out and how likely those outcomes were, partici-
pants were given blank pie chart templates and pens. Each template
sheet had one blank circle for the machine on the left and another
identical one for the machine on the right, each with an indica-
tor for the center of circle to aid in drawing. Most participants
readily understood this instruction but all watched the experi-
menter create an example pie chart and had the opportunity to
ask questions. This method was chosen both for its familiarity
for participants and for its convenience for eliciting comparable
judgments between groups of the size of the outcome space. By
providing blank response templates, this design requires partici-
pants to generate the outcome space and associated probabilities
without being prompted by the experimenter for different out-
come values. Alternative methods of elicitation of probabilities,
such as prompting responses one outcome at a time, or listing the
full space of outcome values for the participant, may have defined
the outcome space for the participant and consequently rendered
their subjective probability distributions invalid. Although phe-
nomena such as sub additivity cannot be investigated in this
paradigm, the benefits for the relevant hypotheses being tested
are greater than this limitation.
PROCEDURE
At the start of the task and at two times during the task, partici-
pants were asked to answer questions. Before beginning machine
play but after being shown the playing environment including the
machines and payout tables, participants were asked to give their
best guess as to the hidden probabilities associated with the out-
come distribution. After completing a pie chart for the machine
on the left of the screen and another for the machine on the
right, participants then began to play the machines. After 30 trials,
the program automatically stopped and prompted participants to
respond to questions. The experimenter presented pen and clean
paper and asked the participant to again illustrate the different pay-
outs they believed the machines generally paid out, and how likely
those payouts were. After 80 trials, the prompts were repeated. The
timing of the prompts after 30 and 80 trials was not known to the
participants. The payout tables that displayed the outcome space
were visible during the first response time before play had begun
but were not visible during the latter two judgment collections;
participants completed these pie charts from memory.
After completing the 80 trials, participants responded to a
forced choice question about the machines’ outcome-generating
processes. Participants were asked which statement most closely
matched their belief: “playing required skill to avoid bad luck or
bad streaks at machines” or “it did not matter what I did or how I
played.”
RESULTS
In this experiment, a mixed design compared two groups’changing
beliefs over time about a hidden outcome distribution, measured
by probability judgments and responses to direct questions after
completion of the task. Neither group was compared to the true
underlying distribution because an infinite number of processes
might have produced the sequences observed by the participants;
only summary statistics (expected value) of the judged probabil-
ity distribution were compared to the observed distribution. The
experience of the two groups varied only on the range of outcomes
listed in the payout tables shown during the task; all participants
experienced slightly different sequences of outcomes due to ran-
dom sampling but no significant differences in the final sum of
outcomes received were found between groups, t (52)= 1.23, ns.
ESTIMATES OF MEAN PAYOUT
Participants in both experimental groups made probability dis-
tribution judgments before play began, after 30 trials, and after
80 trials. At these collection times, participants were asked to
report what payouts they thought the machine paid out in general,
and how likely were those payouts. An example of a participant’s
response in pie chart form is shown in Figure 2.
The first analysis of these data is of the raw mean estimates
calculated using participants’ pie charts, as shown in Figure 3. By
measuring each pie chart segment, we were able to assess how
likely the participant believed each outcome to be and there-
fore the participant’s subjective expected value for a play of the
slot machine. In the example shown in Figure 2, the participant
expresses a belief that the probability of an outcome of 0 pence is
50% and the subjective expected value of a play of the machine
is 7.74 pence. Estimates of the left and right machines were aver-
aged (no differences between expected value estimates given for
left and right machines (paired samples t tests, all ps> 0.24),
resulting in a single data point for each subject at each time
point. Analysis of these data finds that there are significant dif-
ferences between the two experimental groups [F(1,49)= 29.95,
p< 0.001, η2p = 0.38], demonstrating that, overall, the payout
table with fictional higher-value outcomes led to higher valuations
FIGURE 2 | Example of a participant’s hand-drawn initial judgment of a
machine’s underlying probability distribution of outcomes. This
participant indicated that the possible outcome space included 0, 2, 3, 4, 5,
10, 15, 20, 25, and 100 pence outcomes and that the most likely outcome
would be of no matching symbols, or 0 pence.
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of the slot machines. Significant effects were also found within
groups over the three judgment times [F(2,98)= 4.18, p< 0.02,
η2p = 0.08]; post hoc Bonferroni-adjusted comparisons show the
difference lies between the first and third judgment times only
(p< 0.01; between first and second: p< 0.92 and between sec-
ond and third: p< 0.09). In other words, valuations gradually
decreased. The payout table and time interaction was also sig-
nificant [F(2,102)= 4.12, p< 0.02, η2p = 0.08] with follow-up
tests showing that the payout tables with the fictional higher-value
outcomes led to higher valuations compared to the control group
at all judgment times (all ps< 0.02). These findings suggest that
participants who were shown skewed payout tables consistently
gave higher estimates of the expected value of a machine play than
control participants, but showed a trend of converging toward
observed values as a function of number of trials played. Splitting
those participants who were shown skewed payout tables further
into those who persisted in representing fictional higher-value out-
comes throughout the duration of the game (shown in Figure 3)
suggests that this difference is primarily driven by the represen-
tation of higher-value outcomes rather than misestimates of the
probability of the true observed outcomes.
Remembering that each participant observed a different ran-
domly generated sequence of outcomes, the next analysis illus-
trated in Figure 4 examines each participant’s pie estimates of the
expected value given their unique observed sequence of outcomes
to assess whether group differences in estimates are due to differ-
ences in observed sequences. Their observed values were compared
to their reported estimates from collection times after 30 and 80
trials, with the left and right machine estimates averaged for each
participant, to calculate an error measure; initial judgments are not
included in this analysis because participants did not observe any
outcomes before making initial judgments. These data confirm
the analysis of the raw estimates: there are significant differences
between the two experimental groups [F(1,51)= 7.06, p< 0.01,
η2p = 0.12] and within groups over the three judgment times
[F(1,51)= 6.45, p< 0.01, η2p = 0.11]. The interaction of the two
factors is also significant [F(1, 51)= 6.29, p< 0.02, η2p = 0.11].
ACCURACY OF PIE ESTIMATES
As shown in Figure 4, control participants who were shown an
accurate payout table made precise estimates not significantly
different from the observed data after 80 trials [M=−0.09,
SE= 0.13; one-sample t -test against 0: t (26)= 0.67, ns] and after
only 30 trials [M=−0.10, SE= 0.13; one-sample t -test against 0:
t (26)= 0.77, ns]. This accuracy provides support for the valid-
ity of this method of subjective probability elicitation to capture
sensible data.
REPRESENTATION OF FICTIONAL HIGHER-VALUE OUTCOMES
Although it is evident that the participants of the two groups per-
ceive the expected value of each machine play differently, further
analysis of the pie charts may explain this difference. Estimates
of the means alone cannot distinguish overestimation of the like-
lihood of observed outcomes (e.g., believing the 5 or 10 pence
outcome happen more frequently than the observed data sug-
gest) from categorically representing higher-value outcomes with
any degree of likelihood (e.g., believing the 100 pence outcome
FIGURE 3 | Implied estimates of mean payout across time. Data from
participants’ pie charts were used to calculate each participants implied
estimate of mean payout. Data shown in solid gray bars are from
participants who were shown accurate payout tables including only valid
outcomes. The data are split based on whether the participant persisted
throughout the game in including the fictional higher-value outcomes of 15,
20, 25, and 100 pence; 8 of 26 participants given skewed payout tables
included the fictional outcomes; no participants given accurate payout
tables did so. Responses for the left and right machines at each judgment
collection time were averaged resulting in one response per participant for
each of the three judgment times.
is possible with 1% probability). The pie charts show that the
primary source of the overestimation comes from maintaining
a belief in the likelihood of the fictional higher-value outcomes.
After 30 trials, 61.54% of participants (16 of 26 participants) in
the skewed payout table group continued to maintain the unsup-
ported belief of at least one higher-value outcome while only
3.70% (1 of 27 participants) indicated the same in the control
group (p< 0.001,Fisher’s exact test). After even 80 trials, the differ-
ence in number of participants maintaining beliefs in higher-value
outcomes remains significant (Skewed: 30.77% or 8 of 26 partic-
ipants; Controls: 0%; p< 0.01, Fisher’s exact test). This pattern
shows that participants converged toward the observed data and
no participants developed a skewed belief of unsupported fictional
higher-value outcomes after having expressed a belief reflecting the
observed outcome values only.
BELIEFS ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE OUTCOME-GENERATING
PROCESS
A direct question probed participants for their beliefs about the
nature of the underlying outcome-generating process. Although
participants were probed only once after the completion of the
task, this assessment enables us to infer, assuming no differ-
ences in beliefs about the outcome-generating processes of slot
machines before beginning the task, whether the task environment
changed participants’ beliefs. It was hypothesized that partici-
pants who were shown the skewed payout table and expected
to receive higher-value outcomes may believe that they are per-
forming poorly on the task when they do not receive the expected
outcomes. When asked whether the outcomes were generated by
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FIGURE 4 | Mean error in payout estimation based on condition and
belief in fictional outcomes. Each participant’s mean observed payout for
each machine was subtracted from each participant’s pie chart estimate of
mean payout for that machine to calculate errors in estimation. The data are
split based on whether the participant persisted throughout the game in
including the fictional higher-value outcomes of 15, 20, 25, and 100 pence;
8 of 26 participants given skewed payout tables included the fictional
outcomes; no participants given accurate payout tables did so. Values
greater than zero indicate overestimation and values close to zero indicate
accurate estimation. Errors for both the left and right machines were
averaged resulting in one error measure per participant per judgment during
machine play.
a random process (a choice between the two statements: “play-
ing required skill to avoid bad luck or bad streaks at machines”
or “it did not matter what I did or how I played”), only 3.84%
(1 of 26 participants) in the control group indicated that skill
was a significant factor while 30.77% (8 of 26 participants) indi-
cated this from the group who viewed skewed payout tables. This
analysis suggests that the different payout tables influenced the
participants’ beliefs about the outcome-generating process. This
difference between groups within the Skewed condition is shown
in Figure 5: those participants who believe skill to be involved
in machine play estimate the machines to be significantly more
valuable than the machines actually are. Indeed, the two are
highly related: a logistic regression predicting belief type finds that
those participants who categorically represent at least one fictional
higher-value outcome are 8.00 times more likely to also believe the
outcome-generating process is based on skill (B= 2.08, p< 0.02).
Although these correlations cannot provide directional explana-
tions for participants’ responses, they support the hypothesis that
beliefs about an underlying outcome distribution and associated
underlying outcome-generating process may be related.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this study, we induced different initial beliefs about the task
environment and observed how the accumulation of evidence
changed those beliefs. The initial beliefs informed participants
of the outcome space in the environment; some participants
FIGURE 5 | Mean error in payout estimation based on structural
beliefs. Mean payout estimate errors are shown for those participants given
skewed payout tables, split based on whether the participant responded
with the belief that the machine play was random or based on skill (8 of 26
participants); data from the control group of participants shown accurate
payout tables is not included because only 1 of 27 participants expressed
belief that machine play was based on skill. Values greater than zero indicate
overestimation and values close to zero indicate accurate estimation. Errors
for both the left and right machines were averaged resulting in one error
measure per participant per judgment during machine play.
were given information congruent with what they would subse-
quently observe while others were given incongruent information
(the description of the outcome space included fictional higher-
value outcomes). Participants who predicted that the machines
would produce fictional higher-value outcomes did so despite
never observing their occurrence, and ultimately attributed the
absence of those outcomes to (lack of) skill. From this experiment,
there are two broad findings: participants integrated observed
evidence with their initial beliefs for probability judgments but
relied heavily on initial information to understand the struc-
ture of the environment. In other words, prior beliefs are more
than just initial information; priors are the basis of internal mod-
els that affect beliefs about the structure of the data-generating
processes.
When participants created pie charts from blank templates, they
had to express not only the probabilities they thought were associ-
ated with outcomes but also the outcomes themselves. Despite
the limitations of this study due to possible error in manual
measurement of participants’ responses, the pattern of categor-
ical responses is clear. The pie charts showed that many partic-
ipants who initially believed that higher-value outcomes would
occur continued to believe so even after playing 30 and 80 trials
and never seeing those outcomes occurring. Observed evidence
alone cannot account for this. The results are contrary to most
memory-based theories that would predict the non-observance
of these outcomes resulting in their absence from the subjec-
tive probability distributions, including those based on availability
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(Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). Similarly, model-free theories, in
which judgment is based solely on experience, are also unable to
account for this. Alternatives such as Bayesian accounts are more
successful in explaining the role of prior beliefs in these judgments.
Bayesian belief revision corresponds with the convergence of judg-
ments over time and the variable weight on prior beliefs relative
to observed evidence. From this perspective, participants’ skewed
judgment in persistently predicting the fictional higher-value out-
comes despite their non-occurrence can be seen as a rational belief:
not enough evidence had been presented to outweigh the initial
belief in the higher-value outcomes.
Up to this point in the analysis, Bayesian accounts are con-
sistent with the behavior we found in this task. However, basic
Bayesian theories do not specify the underlying cognitive process
and have no explanation for the differences in the beliefs of ran-
domness in the outcome-generating process required to explain
the critical results. The evident difference in beliefs about how the
outcomes are generated dictates that more is needed to explain
the overall results – beliefs about the structure of the environment
is the critical element. The model-based approach, which relies
on the player’s representation and understanding of the struc-
ture of the game, tolerates the updating of probabilities based on
evidence in parallel with the persistent representation of higher-
value outcomes on the basis of no observed evidence at all.
Although we probed participants only once for their attitudes
regarding the data-generating process, those responses consid-
ered along with the probability judgments illustrate that initial
beliefs have qualitative effects on subsequent judgments of prob-
ability and understanding of the structure of the environment.
Future research should aim to capture a richer understanding
of belief revision and decision making strategies by using addi-
tional measures and analysis methods, such as measuring prob-
ability judgments more often or such methods as those used in
Jansen et al. (2012). This experiment demonstrates that theories
of decision making must account for beliefs about the under-
lying data-generating process. In this broad sense, both heuris-
tic and Bayesian theories that either approximate or explicitly
include such causal beliefs may adequately describe the behav-
ior in this task (Krynski and Tenenbaum, 2007). Future research
should seek to refine and enrich our understanding of model
structure.
Gambles are effectively inference problems in which the player
must learn about hidden underlying outcome distributions and
outcome-generating processes by generalizing from samples. Slot
machines are a paradigm in which decision makers must learn
over time about the value of their actions. While a die has six
sides each with equal likelihood of landing face-up, a slot machine
has an unknown number of symbols in unknown locations and
ratios on each reel and an unknown algorithm determining the
outcomes. Ultimately, slot machines pose the highest risk among
games of chance because the unknown probabilities permit play-
ers to persist in believing (Griffiths, 1990). A question often
raised is, “How many times did the individual continue to bet
despite losing?” But it is the nature of the data-generating process
that informs the predictability of the game and the rational-
ity of a wager. It is the player’s representation of the game and
how outcomes are generated that determines whether he suc-
ceeds in learning or persists in failing in the face of uncertainty.
The models internal to the player are critical to understand-
ing why people can persist in gambling despite losses (Gilovich,
1983; Walker, 1992). The conclusions from this research could be
applied to future treatment research, improving targeted efforts
to modify beliefs about the data-generating processes underly-
ing gambles. Cognitive-based treatments have shown therapeutic
gains (Bujold et al., 1994; Ladouceur et al., 1998); however, our
research suggests that further efficacy gains may be made by
focusing on the patient’s internal model of the gamble rather
than teaching general principles of randomness. Similarly, simple
changes to game infrastructure, such as displaying the proba-
bilities of all outcomes rather than only the long-run expected
value, may reduce inappropriate beliefs about the games. Gam-
bles can be such difficult inference problems precisely because
the player has so little information about his environment but
must use his model nonetheless. Under uncertainty, the focus of
our research should be on the cognitive process as well as the
outcomes.
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